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CASE COMMENTS
Obviously society has a definite interest in protecting marital status,
and this interest has in fact been traditionally protected by the courts.
If Hinsdale establishes a rule that all alleged libel affecting marital
status, by placing it in a derogatory light, is actionable without proof
of special damages, it has added a fifth category to the libel per quod
areas presently not requiring special damages. Perhaps, in light of
society's interest in marital union this is good. But if the court has
indeed established this category, without clearly stating so, it has only
added more confusion for the future.
It appears more logical, however, that the result in Hinsdale clarifies
the New York dispute over special damages by adhering to the rule of
Sydney that all libel whether proved by extrinsic facts or not is
actionable without proof of special damages. Hinsdale rejects O'Con-
nell as a holding that special damages are required in libel per quod
action, a proposition for which it has been cited, and in so doing ap-
pears to completely eliminate libel per quod as a necessary categorical
distinction in determining recovery.
If this is indeed the result, Hinsdale will be of strong persuasive
authority to other jurisdictions to follow New York and the common
law in eliminating this requirement of special damage in libel per
quod.4
MICHAEL L. Lowity
A DOUBLE TEST FOR INFAMOUS CRIMES
The moralistic term "infamous crime" is used in different contexts.
Consequently, the courts have not been able to formulate a satisfactory,
all encompassing definition. Two basic tests have evolved for defining
an infamous crime: the nature of the crime and the punishment which
may be imposed.
In the California case of Otsuka v. Hite,' plaintiffs had been con-
victed of violation of the Selective Service Act, a federal felony.
Though the convictions had occurred twenty years earlier, the Regis-
trar of Voters for Los Angeles County refused to register plaintiffs
as qualified electors. In so doing, the Registrar relied upon a California
constitutional provision which prohibits any person convicted of an in-
42This rule concerning libel is advocated by many legal writers. See HAMPa,
ToRTs § 243, at 519 (1933); SEEM AN, Tm LAw oF LMlEL AND SLANDER 64-65
(1933).
164 Cal. 2d -, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 414 P.2d 412 (1966).
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famous crime from exercising the privileges of an elector in that state..
2
Concededly, in all other respects plaintiffs were qualified as electors, and
the sole reason for registration denial was the felony conviction. The
Registrar urged that this was an infamous crime conviction upon the
theory that the phrase "infamous crime" includes any felony. The trial
court ruled, as a matter of law, that the felony sentence rendered plain-
tiffs ineligible to vote under the constitutional prohibition. The Supreme
Court of California reversed and held that under the California Con-
stitution the plaintiffs could not be excluded as electors. To preserve
the constitutionality of the provision, the term "infamous crime" was
held not to comprehend all felonies. Rather, the phrase "must be
limited to conviction of crimes involving moral corruption and dis-
honesty, thereby branding their perpetrator as a threat to the integrity
-of the elective process." 3 A dissent would have affirmed the judgment
of the lower court for the reason that the majority opinion requires
the Registrar of Voters to ascertain when a felony involves moral
corruption and dishonesty sufficient to menace the elective process
without providing a standard by which to reach such a determination.
4
The term "infamous crime" had its genesis in the Roman law concept
of infamia wherein moral censure of certain actions resulted in dis-
qualification of both public and private legal rights.5 Additional dis-
qualifications subsequently have been added.6 At common law, specific
2CAL. CoNST. art. 11, § 1, provides in relevant part that "no person convicted
of any infamous crime . . . shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this
State...."
351 Cal. Rptr. at 286, 414 P.2d at 414.
4The California legislature has made provision for restoration of the voting
privilege by executive pardon to a person convicted of a crime in that State.
CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 4852.01-4852.17 (Deering 1961). Although plaintiffs were
convicted of a federal crime, a similar method for regaining civil rights, in-
cluding the franchise, is available under federal administrative procedure through
executive clemency. 28 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.9 (1966). These processes objectively de-
termine when rehabilitation has progressed to a point that all the rights and
privileges of citizenship safely may be restored. Plaintiffs did not pursue this
administrative remedy though long eligible to do so, the waiting period subse-
quent to release having expired. The dissent would have affirmed the judgment
for this reason, also.
54 PouND, JURISPRUDENCE 363 (1959).
(Conviction of an infamous crime may subject an individual to numerous
deprivations such as ineligibility for the General Assembly, ILL. CoNsr. art. IV,
§ 4; or for any office of profit or trust, State ex rel. Moore v. Blake, 225 Ala. 124,
142 So. 418 (1932); ineligibility for letters of administration, Nichols v. Smith,
186 Ala. 587, 65 So. 30 (1914); weakening of credibility as a witness, People v.
Birdette, 22 Ill. 2d 577, 177 N.E.2d 170 (1961); ineligibility to serve as a juror,
las.. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-2 (1964); and loss of the franchise, Washington
v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884). Conviction of an infamous crime also may constitute
grounds for divorce. Hartwig v. Ilartwig, 160 Mo. App. 284, 142 S.V. 797, 799
(1912).
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crimes were labeled infamous on the basis of the nature of the crime.
7
A different infamous crime criterion has been used by the United
States Supreme Court in interpreting the fifth amendment requirement
that "a capital or otherwise infamous crime" prosecution must be made
by grand jury presentment or indictment. In Ex parte WilsonS the
Court emphasized that the foremost word "capital" delineated the
criminal act solely on the basis of punishment. Therefore, the Court
reasoned, by a simple rule of construction, immediately following the
phrase, "or otherwise infamous crime," necessarily relates to punish-
ment." However, Wilson only held that confinement for a term of
years at hard labor10 constitutes infamous punishment sufficient to
establish an infamous crime within the fifth amendment." One year
later, in Mackin v. United States12 the Court extended Wilson by
holding that a federal crime punishable by imprisonment in a prison
or penitentiary,1 3 with or without hard labor,14 is an infamous crime.'1
7See, e.g., United States v. Field, 16 Fed. 778 (C.C.D. Vt. 1883); United States
v. Yates, 6 Fed. 861, 866 (ED.N.Y. 1881); King v. State, 17 Fla. 183, 185-86 (1879);
State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 64-65 (1836). In United States v. Block, 24 Fed. Cas.
1174, 1175 (No. 14609) (D. Ore. 1877), it is said that to be infamous at common
law a crime involving a charge of falsehood must not only be of such nature
and purpose as to make it likely that "the party committing it is void of truth
and insensible to the obligation of an oath," but the falsehood must also be "cal-
culated to injuriously affect the public administration of justice.
8114 U.S. 417 (1885).
91d. at 423-24. The Court further held that a crime may be infamous although
not so declared by Congress. Id. at 426.
10See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896), wherein it is
expressed that for more than a hundred years in both England and America, con-
finement at hard labor in a penitentiary, state prison or similar institution has
been considered infamous punishment.
11114 U.S. at 429.
12117 U.S. 348 (1886).
13By congressional definition a felony is any offense punishable by death or
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1) (1964). Federal
statutes provide that one sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than
one year may be confined in a federal penitentiary. 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (1964).
14See In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1894); Falconi v. United States, 280
Fed. 766 (6th Cir. 1922). An exception is made where the status of the crime
clearly indicates it is not infamous. In Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87
(1958), the Supreme Court, holding that criminal contempt is not infamous, re-
jected the argument that criminal contempt is an infamous crime solely on the
basis that it may be punishable for more than one year in the penitentiary. In
consideration of factors such as absence of a statutory limitation of the amount
of a fine or length of a prison sentence which may be imposed for their com-
mission, traditionally criminal contempts have differed from the usual federal
statutory crime and are of unique constitutional character.
15117 U.S. at 352.
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The test depends on the punishment that may be imposed, not that
which actually is imposed.10
While the punishment test is used to ensure fifth amendment pro-
tection, the nature of a crime is material in the determination of
eligibility for a civil right.'7 At common law the competency of a
witness to testify was governed by the character of the crime com-
mitted and not by the extent or type of punishment inflicted.1 8 The
theory for disqualification was that a person capable of committing
such a heinous act was so wretched that his testimony was unworthy
of belief.19
For the purpose of ascertaining eligibility for a civil right, some
courts, adhering to the Wilson principle, had held that any felony is
an infamous crime.20 For example, the highest court in Iowa, in
interpreting its Constitution,21 which provides that "no idiot, or in-
sane person, or person convicted of an infamous crime, shall be en-
titled to the privileges of an elector," held in Blodgett v. Clarke2 2 that
any crime punishable by penitentiary confinement is an infamous
crime. A like result was reached in Briggs v. Board of County
Comn 'rs.P There an Oklahoma statute provided for vacancy in office
upon conviction of an infamous crime. The sheriff of Muskogee
County sought to enjoin the Commissioners from disqualifying him
16United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 441 (1922); Fitzpatrick v. United
States, 178 U.S. 304, 307 (1900); In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200, 205 (1891); United
States v. J. Lindsey Wells Co., 186 Fed. 248, 250 (W.D. Tenn. 1910).
'7County of Schuylkill v. Copley, 67 Pa. 386, 390-91 (1871).
1SBuder v. Wentworth, 84 Me. 25, 24 AtI. 456 (1891). Crimes which dis-
qualified a person as a witness were treason, felony, forgery, and "the crirnen
falsi, of the Roman law, such as perjury, subornation of perjury, barratry, con-
spiracy, swindling, cheating, and other crimes of kindred nature." Id. at 458.
19Wick v. Baldwin, 51 Ohio St. 51, 36 N.E. 671, 672 (1894).
20See Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959); Truchon v.
Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). Stephens and
Truchon were mandamus proceedings to compel the registrar of voters to register
petitioner where refusal to do so was on the basis of CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
While the issue involved conviction only, the court in both instances stated
that a felony was an infamous crime within the constitutional provision. In
equating felony with infamous crime, both Truchon and Stephens relied on
Ex parte Westenberg, 167 Cal. 309, 139 Pac. 674 (1914), wherein it was stated:
"Crimes are infamous either by reason of their punishment or by reason of their
nature. In the first class fall all felonies, as the punishment therefor is imprison-
ment in the state prison." Id. at 679. However, the Westenberg definition of
"infamous crime" was in the context of right to prosecution by indictment or
presentment for a capital or other infamous crime, which distinction was omitted
in Stephens and Truchon.
21IowA CoNsr. art 2, § 5.
22177 Iowa 575, 159 N.W. 243, 244 (1916).
23202 Okla. 684, 217 P.2d 827 (1950).
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and appointing someone to fill his vacancy under this statute. Relying
on the Wilson doctrine, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that
conviction of the felony of conspiracy to violate federal law by con-
ducting a wholesale liquor business without paying the federal tax
constituted an infamous crime.
Concomitantly, for a civil right disqualification as a result of a
felony conviction, other courts have relied on the common law nature
of the crime without regard to severity of the punishment which
was or could have been prescribed.24 Such was the common law rule
under which the blemish on moral character which rendered a party
incompetent to testify was founded in the nature of the offense and
not in the magnitude of the penalty.25 Where a state statute dealt
with witness disqualification for conviction of an infamous crime, it
was stated that the term bore the common law connotation unless
otherwise defined by the statute.
26
In State v. Laboon27 a South Carolina court was presented the ques-
tion whether a party previously convicted of manslaughter, a felony,
was qualified to testify as a state witness. In deciding affirmatively
for competency of the testimony, the court declared that for disquali-
fication of a witness on the basis of conviction of an infamous crime,
the crime not only had to encompass falsehood or fraud, but had to
be of such character as to reasonably imply that the person convicted
was "devoid of truth and insensible to the obligations of an oath." 2
The Laboon court stated that "clearly . . . neither a change in the
nature of the punishment, nor the designation of an offense as a felony,
alters the moral qualities which must be taken into consideration in
determining whether the offense is infamous." 29
The prior conviction in Laboon was apparently from the same state.
Thus the state was free to determine whether the crime was infamous
by applying its own standards. However, a subtle question arises as
to what effect a prior conviction in a federal court of a crime made
infamous by conviction alone has on a state court proceeding involving
possible loss of a civil right as a consequence of such conviction. Must
a state accept the initial federal determination that the crime is in-
24Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 At. 417, 420 (1914).
25See Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17, 25 (1881), wherein it is stated: "The test
seems to be, 'whether the crime shows such depravity in the perpetrator, or such
a disposition to pervert public justice in the courts, as creates a violent presump-
tion against his truthfulness under oath."'
26Smith v. State, 129 Ala. 89, 29 So. 699 (1901).
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famous, or should it make an independent inquiry through application
of its own standards?
In Garitee v. BondS0 wherein appellant had been denied letters of
administration because of a federal felony conviction, the court, in
reversing, held that a state court is not required to regard a crime as
infamous for disqualification purposes solely because it is infamous
within federal fifth amendment protection contemplation. Garitee
cited State v. Bixler,31 a case in which the same state court had
occasion to interpret the phrase "infamous crime" within the state's
constitutional provision excluding as an elector any person convicted
of an infamous crime unless pardoned by the governor. Bixier stated,
The Constitution in providing for exclusion from suffrage of per-
sons whose character was too bad to be permitted to vote, could
only have intended, by the language used, such crimes as were
"infamous" at common law, and are described as such in common
law authorities.8
2
Thus the federal felony of which appellant was convicted in Garitee
was insufficient to render him ineligible for letters of administration
since it did not involve "the degree of moral turpitude which would
have been requisite to make his transgression an infamous crime at
common law." 3
Logically the classification of a crime for loss of a civil right should
be established by its quality and not by its penalty.- 4 As between
the two categories, the nature of the crime is preferable for the
reason that punishment does not always characterize the infamous
crime, but the presence or absence of moral turpitude always dis-
tinguishes it.3- Therefore the characteristics of a crime and not its
nomenclature should be of primary concern.3 6
30102 Md. 379, 62 Ad. 631, 633 (1905).
3162 Md. 354 (1884).
321d. at 360.
3362 Ad. at 633.
34Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, Ill Ad. 861, 863 (1920).
The court recognized that infamous crimes affecting credibility of witnesses
should not be limited to those common law categories of treason, felony and the
crimen falsi but should be expanded to other crimes of grievous import created
by the necessities of a changing society. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. at 427, and
Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. at 351, also declared that evolution in public
opinion from one period to another may affect what punishment is considered in-
famrous.
35 Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 Ad. 861, 863 (1920).
30People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 IU. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, 177 (1958).
Under an Illinois statute, conviction of an infamous crime creates a vacancy in
